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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No- 900088 
v. : 
PEGGY B. JOHNSON, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant• ; 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for three counts of 
attempted first degree murder, all first degree felonies, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202 and 76-4-101 (1990), and 
distribution of a controlled substance, marijuana, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
(1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1989) because the appeal is 
from a district court in a criminal case involving a first degree 
felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the 
jury's verdict. The standard of review in jury verdicts is 
whether the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime. State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 
1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). 
2. Whether defendant has waived the right to challenge 
the admission of her statements by failing to raise an objection 
to their admission at trial. Generally, appellate courts will 
not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). 
3. Whether the trial court correctly determined that 
the corpus delicti rule did not apply to the statements of 
defendant. This is a question of law subject to correction of 
error standard of review. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 129 
Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 6 (Utah March 2, 1990). 
4. Whether defendant's statements were sufficiently 
corroborated to allow their admission into evidence under the 
corpus delicti rule. Since there was no objection at trial to 
admission of the statements and the trial court's finding after 
trial did not address the sufficiency to establish corpus 
delicti, this Court may only review the issue under a plain error 
standard. However, defendant has not argued plain error. State 
v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581 (Utah 1983), cert, denied Norton v. 
Utah, 466 U.S. 942 (1984). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies are included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged on February 1, 1988, with three 
counts of attempted first degree murder, all felonies of the 
first degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-202 and 76-
4-101 (1990), and one count of distribution of a controlled 
substance, marijuana, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 3-5). 
Defendant's trial counsel, Quinn D. Hunsaker, filed 
several pretrial motions, including a motion for transcript of 
the preliminary hearing, for a bill of particulars, for release 
of evidence, for court funds for discovery and preparation for 
trial, for discovery, and for a court appointed expert witness 
(R. at 102-106, 110-19 and 157). Counsel also filed a notice of 
entrapment defense (R. at 127). The court granted the motions 
for a transcript of the preliminary hearing, for a bill of 
particulars, to release evidence, for discovery, and took under 
advisement the motions for court funds and for a court appointed 
expert (R. at 103, 106, 111, 117, 113, 119, and 129). 
The trial court heard the entrapment motion on 
September 8, 1988, and denied it (R. at 160). Trial settings of 
July 11, 1988, and August 29, 1988, were vacated and defendant 
was tried by jury on September 12 through 16, 1988, in the First 
Judicial District Court, in and for Box Elder County, the 
Honorable Gordon J. Low, district judge, presiding (R. at 96-99 
and 125). Defendant was found guilty as charged (R. at 200-202 
and transcripts of trial). 
On October 13, 1988, Ronald J. Yengich entered his 
appearance of counsel, and, on October 26, 1988, Mr. Yengich 
filed a motion to continue sentencing (R. at 244-45). A motion 
to set bail pending sentencing was filed on October 24, 1988 (R. 
at 257). A hearing on both motions was held on October 26, 1988, 
and the sentencing was continued until November 7, 1988; the 
motion to set bail was denied (R. at 261). On November 7, 1988, 
defendant was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State 
Prison on each of counts one, two and three, and zero to five 
years in the Utah State Prison on count four. All terms were to 
run concurrently and defendant was ordered to pay restitution in 
the amount of $14,841.02 (R. at 262) An order memorializing that 
sentence was signed by Judge Low on November 9, 1988 (R. at 264-
65). 
On November 18, 1988, defendant filed a motion for new 
trial, but did not state a basis for the motion or attach 
affidavits or evidence (R. at 266-67). Defendant then filed a 
notice of appeal and a motion for certificate of probable cause 
in the district court on November 22, 1988 (R. at 268 and 272). 
The prosecution filed an objection to the motion for new trial, 
stating that because the motion did not give the grounds for a 
new trial, the prosecution was unable to prepare a response (R. 
at 275). The prosecution also asked for a hearing on the motion 
for certificate of probable cause (R. at 277). The trial court 
ordered that the motion for new trial would not be heard until 
defendant filed the affidavits and memoranda required by the 
rules. The court also ordered defendant to submit affidavits and 
memoranda in support of the motion for certificate of probable 
cause (R. at 285-86). 
At a hearing on May 2, 1989, defense counsel was given 
three weeks to file a brief in support of the motion for new 
trial, and the prosecutor allowed two weeks to respond (R. at 
295). In a memorandum in support of the motion for new trial or, 
-4-
in the alternative, motion for dismissal, filed on June 22, 1989, 
defendant raised the claim that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the verdicts at trial (R. at 298-304). Then, for the 
first time, defendant claimed that her statements should not have 
been admitted because the State had failed to establish the 
corpus delicti before introducing the statements (R. at 305-10). 
The motion for new trial was finally argued on August 29, 1989, 
and was taken under advisement (R. at 326). In a memorandum 
decision issued September 7, 1989, the trial court denied the 
motion and an order to that effect was signed on September 19, 
1989 (R. at 327-31). Defendant filed a second notice of appeal 
from the original judgment and sentence and from the denial of 
the motion for new trial on September 22, 1989 (R. at 332). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant is married to Danny Johnson, the victim in 
this case (Transcript [hereinafter Tr.] at 363). Defendant is a 
bail bondswoman in Box Elder County and also owns a bar called 
"The Shack" in Willard, Utah (Tr. at 663, 501, 670 and 702). 
Cindy Orozco first met defendant in approximately 1982 when 
defendant bailed Cindy out of jail (Tr. at 398 and 663). 
Defendant provided that service for Cindy at least one more time 
and was aware that Cindy had eventually gone to prison (Tr. at 
663-64). Cindy had also asked defendant to bail Cindy's husband, 
Richard (nicknamed Penny), but defendant was unable to do so 
because defendant was not authorized to post: a bond in the Ogden 
City Jail (Tr. at 664 and 400). 
In December 1987, defendant contacted Cindy through 
another person because Cindy did not have a telephone in her home 
(Tr. at 398-99). Cindy returned the call and defendant began 
talking to Cindy about a guitar and car stereo which Cindy and 
Penny had given defendant as collateral for a bail bond (Tr. at 
399). Cindy had assumed that the items were gone because the 
Orozcos had not paid defendant, but defendant told Cindy that she 
wanted to talk about how the Orozcos could get the property back 
(Tr. at 399). 
Within a week, defendant met with the Orozcos (Tr. at 
400). During the conversation, defendant asked Cindy if Cindy 
knew of a drug with which a person could overdose (Tr. at 400). 
At that time, the Orozcos were involved in drug use (Tr. at 401). 
Defendant told the Orozcos that she wanted to "get rid of her 
husband" because they were having problems (Tr. at 401 and 670). 
Cindy did not want to get involved so she walked away and the 
subject changed to a discussion about defendant helping Penny set 
up a recording session for his singing (Tr. at 401-402). 
Defendant met again with Cindy in the first part of 
January 1988 and told her that defendant's husband, Danny, had a 
girlfriend, that Danny was beating defendant, and that defendant 
could not divorce Danny because she thought Danny "would get half 
of everything that [defendant's] dad had left her" (Tr. at 403-
404). At that meeting, Cindy told defendant that she had checked 
with "a few people" and it would cost $300.00 to buy enough 
heroin to overdose Danny. The Orozcos then got in defendant's 
car and traveled with her to Ogden (Tr. at 404). 
In Ogden, defendant and Penny got out of the car at a 
bar and Cindy took the car to a drug dealer's house. Cindy 
remembers that defendant either handed her the $300.00 or left it 
next to the driver's seat in the car (Tr. at 404-405). The 
dealer told Cindy where she could get the heroin and sold a half 
gram of cocaine to Cindy. Cindy returned to the bar and lied to 
defendant, telling her that Cindy had purchased a sample of 
heroin to "see how good it was" (Tr. at 405). Cindy tried to 
return the balance of the money to defendant, but defendant told 
Cindy to keep it; defendant said that she trusted Cindy (Tr. at 
405-406). Cindy told defendant that she would go to Salt Lake 
City the next day and purchase the heroin. Defendant then took 
Cindy and Penny back to their home (Tr. at 406). 
The next day, defendant returned to ask Cindy if she 
had purchased the heroin. Cindy lied to her and said a friend 
was going to bring it and, probably the next day. Cindy did not 
purchase the heroin at that time; instead, she and Penny spent 
the $300.00 on cocaine for themselves (Tr. at 407 and 620-21). 
For a week, defendant continually asked whether the heroin was 
available yet; meanwhile, Cindy went out stealing every day in an 
effort to get the money to return to defendant. Eventually, 
Cindy told defendant that the money had been spent and asked 
defendant if she was trying to set Cindy up (Tr. at 408). 
Defendant assured Cindy that defendant was not trying to send 
Cindy back to prison (Tr. at 409). Defendant also brought one of 
her daughter's to Cindy's house to tell about the beatings by 
Danny; this convinced Cindy to help defendant (Tr. at 410 and 
622). 
The Orozcos went to a source in Ogden who told them 
that it would cost $450.00 for the amount of heroin they wanted 
(Tr. at 411). On January 21, 1988, the Orozcos went to the Shack 
and met with defendant (Tr. at 412). Pursuant to defendant's 
plan, Cindy played a dice game that was set up at the bar and 
defendant handed her the $450.00 as if they were gambling 
winnings (Tr. at 413-15, 578-80 and 616). The Orozcos left the 
bar and went to Salt Lake where they purchased the heroin and 
some cocaine (Tr. at 416-17). They went back to Ogden, called 
defendant at the Shack and told her that they had the heroin (Tr. 
at 417-18). Defendant told Cindy that she would go to Cindy's 
house to pick it up (Tr. at 418). 
Before defendant arrived, Cindy and Penny mixed some of 
the heroin with cocaine and used it. When defendant arrived, 
Cindy told Penny to give the heroin to defendant, that Cindy did 
not want to deal with it (Tr. at 418-19 and 618-19). Cindy 
watched Penny hand the heroin to defendant, then rebuffed 
defendant when defendant thanked her (Tr. at 419). 
About three days later, on January 24, Penny wanted to 
purchase more cocaine and sent Cindy to defendant's house to ask 
to borrow money (Tr. at 420). At that time, defendant told Cindy 
that the heroin had not worked (Tr. at 420-21). 
On January 27, 1988, Cindy was aware that the police 
were looking for her about some stolen property (Tr. at 423 and 
99). Cindy met with officer Marci Vaughn of the Ogden Police 
Department on that day to offer to help apprehend drug dealers in 
return for leniency on a theft charge (Tr. at 423, 91 and 99). 
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Cindy also met with her parole officer and told him about 
defendant's attempt to kill Danny. The parole officer told 
Officer Vaughn about the attempted homicide and Officer Vaughn 
confronted Cindy with the information (Tr. at 424 and 102-103). 
Cindy decided to cooperate with the police in investigating the 
allegations against defendant (Tr. at 424-25). 
The next day, Cindy met with Officer Vaughn and Officer 
Steve Vojtecky of the Utah Division of Investigations (Tr. at 
114-15). At Officer Vojtecky's direction, Cindy telephoned 
defendant at the Shack in an attempt to verify the information 
which Cindy had given the officers (Tr. at 116-17). That 
conversation was recorded and introduced at trial as Exhibit 1 
(the tape) and Exhibit 7 (a transcript of the tape) (Tr. at 117-
18). In that conversation, defendant told Cindy that she had a 
"new idea" but would not speak about it because Danny was there 
(St. Exh. #7 at page 2). Cindy made a second telephone call to 
defendant at her home which was also recorded (Tr. at 118). In 
this call, defendant said that she did not want to talk about the 
"new idea" over the telephone (St. Exh. #7 at page 8). 
A planned meeting between defendant and Cindy for 2:00 
p.m. on January 29 fell through because defendant had car trouble 
(St. Exh. #7 at pages 16-17). As agreed between defendant and 
Cindy, Cindy went to defendant's home at approximately 6:00 p.m. 
on January 29 (St. Exh. #7 at page 17 and St. Exh. 8-1 at page 
1). Cindy wore a body mike and Officer Vojtecky recorded the 
conversation from outside the Johnson home (Tr. at 130). In the 
home, defendant asked Cindy if she knew where to get some "crank" 
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which is a street name for methamphetamine (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 
3, and Tr. at 174-75). Defendant told Cindy that defendant had 
seen a program on TV in which they had said that too much crank 
would kill a person (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 4). Defendant then 
told Cindy that she had used the heroin, Decon (a rodent poison), 
and oxalic acid to try to kill Danny (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 4). 
Defendant told Cindy that she had used a whole bottle of oxalic 
acid by putting it in Danny's medicine capsules (St. Exh. #8-1 at 
pages 4-5). She showed Cindy the bottle with the crystalline 
substance in it (Tr. at 428). Defendant then asked how much 
liquid heroin it would take to kill Danny and discussed how to 
administer the overdose (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 5). Cindy left, 
saying that she would see what she could do about getting crank 
(St. Exh. #8-1 at page 7). 
After leaving the home, Cindy met with Officer Vojtecky 
who asked her to go back into the home and ask for money for the 
crank and to try to get defendant to tell Cindy again how she was 
going to administer the drug (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 8). Cindy 
returned to the home and asked defendant how she was going to 
give Danny the drug; defendant replied that she was going to put 
it in his capsules (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 10. Defendant then 
said: 
I cannot tell how his stomach can hold up to 
it. I can't. I . . . I mean I really 
believe only the good die young. 
(St. Exh. #8-1 at page 10). Defendant also suggested some drug 
dealers that Cindy could contact to try to get the 
methamphetamine (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 10). 
About four hours later, Cindy telephoned defendant at 
the Shack and told her that Cindy would be able to get the crank. 
Cindy asked Danny's weight and size in order to tell how much 
crank was needed. Defendant asked how much the drug was per gram 
and Cindy asked if defendant wanted her to ask how much it would 
cost for an amount sufficient to kill someone. Defendant told 
her not to tell her friend that, because defendant did not want 
Cindy's friend to know what the drug was for (St. Exh. #9-1 at 
page 2). Defendant told Cindy Danny's weight and height and 
Cindy told defendant that it would take about a quarter-ounce of 
crank and would cost $500.00. Defendant appeared unhappy that it 
would cost so much and asked for time to decide. Cindy told 
defendant that the overdose would cause kidney failure and that 
the dealer was running low on the drug. Defendant asked Cindy to 
call back in an hour (St. Exh. #9-1 at page 3). Cindy called 
back and defendant told her that defendant wanted the crank, but 
that she would not have the cash until the next morning. They 
arranged for defendant to go to Cindy's house to get the drug the 
next day (St. Exh. #9-1 at page 4). 
On January 30, 1988, defendant did not arrive at 
Cindy's house at the arranged time, so Cindy telephoned defendant 
(St. Exh. #10 and Tr. at 138 and 140-41). Defendant said that 
she had forgotten to do her quarterly taxes which were due by 
2:00 p.m. Cindy asked if defendant still wanted the crank and 
defendant replied that she did. Defendant said that she would be 
at Cindy's house in an hour and a half and would bring the money 
(St. Exh. #10 at page 2). Defendant said that she was getting 
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the money as a check from defendant's mother and that she would 
have to cash it (St. Exh. #10 at page 3). 
At approximately 2:15 p.m. on January 30, Officer 
Vaughn searched Cindy at Cindy's house prior to defendant 
arriving there (St. Exh. #10 at page 3). Officer Vaughn then hid 
in a closet and took notes of the meeting between Cindy and 
defendant (Tr. at 109-110 and 237). Officer Vojtecky was acting 
as Cindy's boyfriend at that point and was lying on her couch as 
if asleep (Tr. at 109 and 237-38). Officer Mike Johnson of the 
Box Elder County Sheriff's Office was outside in a surveillance 
van recording the meeting from a mike worn by Cindy (Tr. at 142-
43 and 238; a copy of the transcript of the tape is attached to 
this brief as Addendum A). Defendant arrived at approximately 
3:30 p.m. (Tr. at 238) 
When defendant arrived at Cindy's house they began 
discussing whether the drug could be placed in Danny's coffee and 
whether it was bitter (St. Exh. #11 at pages 1-2). Cindy asked 
how defendant was going to give the drug to Danny and defendant 
said she did not know, that that is why she wondered what it 
looked like. She and Cindy discussed what volume the powder 
would be (St. Exh. #11 at page 2). Officer Vojtecky entered the 
conversation at that point and Cindy vouched for him to defendant 
(St. Exh. #11 at pages 3-4). Defendant asked Officer Vojtecky 
whether crank was bitter and they discussed whether it could be 
put in coffee. They discussed how big Danny was; then defendant 
asked Cindy if she had told Vojtecky what defendant had already 
tried. Defendant then told Vojtecky that she had put nearly a 
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whole bottle of the crystalline oxalic acid in Danny's capsules 
over the previous month and it "ha[dn't] worked" (St. Exh. #11 at 
page 4). Defendant told Vojtecky that Danny was still taking the 
oxalic acid. Danny was taking "four different kinds of pills 
every day" and that the oxalic acid was in some of the pills (St. 
Exh. #11 at page 5). 
Defendant then told Vojtecky that she had given Danny a 
whole box of Decon (a rodent poison) in his capsules but that 
that "[d]idn't do a thing" (St. Exh. #11 at page 5). She told 
him about putting the heroin in a capsule on January 21; Danny 
had taken it, and five hours later he vomited. Defendant went 
into great detail about how the heroin was placed in the capsule 
and how she had given the doctored capsule to Danny directly (St. 
Exh. #11 at pages 6-7). Defendant and Vojtecky discussed what 
defendant's plan was when Danny was dead; defendant explained her 
reasons for wanting to kill Danny (St. Exh. #11 at pages 7-8). 
In response to questions from Vojtecky, defendant said 
that she was going to put the crank in Danny's coffee one night 
when he came home (St. Exh. #11 at page 8). Defendant told 
Vojtecky that she had tried for two years to divorce Danny but 
was afraid that he would get half of the property left to her by 
her father. Vojtecky told her that the "stuff" (methamphetamine) 
would kill Danny, and asked if she wanted to kill him. Defendant 
responded, "This sounds horrible, but yes." They then talked 
about where defendant got the money for the drug (St. Exh. #11 at 
page 9). 
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Defendant told Vojtecky and Cindy that Danny was always 
taking other people's prescription drugs and that no one would 
ever think that defendant had killed her husband. Defendant 
talked about the fact that it was costing her $1300.00 to try to 
kill Danny. The money was spent for the purchase of the heroin 
and the crank and, to that point, "nothing has worked" (St. Exh. 
#11 at page 10). The three discussed how to make contact to hand 
over the methamphetamine after Vojtecky and Cindy supposedly 
purchased it (St. Exh. #11 at page 11 and St. Exh. 21 at page 
12). In reality, Cindy and Officer Vaughn had earlier mixed 
brown sugar and flour to make a fake "crank" to give to defendant 
(Tr. at 95). 
Before defendant left Cindy's home, Vojtecky asked 
defendant whether she was going to give Danny the drug that 
night; defendant answered that she would probably wait until the 
next night or Monday night. Vojtecky again asked if defendant 
was going to put the drug in Danny's coffee. Defendant asked 
Vojtecky, "Do you want to take me out next week? (laughter)" (St. 
Exh. #21 at page 12). Throughout the whole encounter, defendant 
was very cordial to Vojtecky (Tr. at 239). She gave him five 
$100.00 bills to purchase the supposed methamphetamine (Tr. at 
240). 
Defendant again justified her actions by telling 
Vojtecky that Danny had beaten her and the children. When 
Vojtecky asked why she did not go to the police, she responded 
that she did not get along with the sheriff's office because she 
was a bail bondsman and had been involved when an officer had 
been accused of raping a woman prisoner (St. Exh. #21 at page 13-
14). After defendant left, Officer Vojtecky sought and received 
a search warrant to search defendant's person, home and car (R. 
at 74-81). 
Vojtecky and Cindy telephoned defendant to arrange the 
final meeting during which they would give defendant the "crank" 
(Tr. at 240). This meeting occurred at an old Highway Patrol 
weigh station near Willard, Utah (Tr. at 240 and 425). At 8:43 
the evening of January 30, defendant met with Vojtecky and Cindy 
and received the "crank" (St. Exh. #12 and Tr. at 425-26 and 240-
45). The recording of that meeting was "quite poor" because the 
microphone picked up traffic noise from the nearby road (Tr. at 
241). When Vojtecky handed defendant the counterfeit 
methamphetamine, defendant, who was seated in the driver's seat 
of her car, appeared to place it under the dashboard or into a 
side panel of the car (Tr. at 426 and 247). Defendant then 
reached quickly toward her back and brought her hand forward with 
a small baggie of marijuana in it (Tr. at 247-28 and 426). 
Defendant handed the baggie to Cindy and said that it was 
something extra for them. Cindy took the baggie which Vojtecky 
eventually retrieved from her after defendant left (Tr. at 248). 
Vojtecky asked the name of whom defendant intended to kill, but 
defendant declined to tell him (Tr. at 427 and St. Exh. 12 at 
page 1). 
After defendant left Cindy and Vojtecky, other officers 
stopped her car and searched it for the "crank". They were 
unable to find the substance even though officers went the next 
day and searched for it by the roadway (Tr, at 269-70 and 295-
99). 
Around the time that the meeting with and arrest of 
defendant were occurring, officers went to the Shack and told 
Danny of his wife's attempts to kill him (Tr. at 213). The 
officers asked forf and received, a pill bottle from Danny which 
contained capsules (Tr. at 209-210, 212 and 363). These capsules 
and bottle were given to an evidence officer who then turned them 
over to the Weber State College Crime Lab for testing (Tr. at 
216, 231 and 161). The capsules were marked as ampicillin but 
did not appear to contain that substance (Tr. at 165). Testing 
showed that the capsules contained the same substance as a bottle 
marked oxalic acid which was seized from defendant's home (Tr. at 
166-69). 
The evidence officer, Lynn Yeates of the Box Elder 
County Sheriff's Office, was involved in executing the search 
warrant for defendant's home (Tr. at 219-20). It was he who 
found the oxalic acid bottle under the kitchen sink in 
defendant's home (Tr. at 219-20 and 233). He transported this 
item to the Weber State Crime Lab, along with the capsules 
retrieved from Danny Johnson and the baggie of marijuana given to 
Cindy by defendant (Tr. at 220-21 and 231-35). 
The victim took the stand in the State's case-in-chief 
and testified that he had been taking the supposed ampicillin 
capsules off and on for a month (Tr. at 363). He had not noticed 
any problem with the pills that he took from the original 
prescription; however, he had experienced stomach cramps, 
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weakness and a burning sensation in his esophagus when his 
prescription had been refilled. He had assumed that the refill 
was causing the problem (Tr. at 364-65). Defendant had refilled 
the prescription about three weeks before her arrest and had told 
Danny that it was a generic brand of ampicillin (Tr. at 372). 
Danny said that every time he took one of the pills, his stomach 
would knot up for about three hours (Tr. at 373). 
Danny also testified that defendant had given him a 
capsule before he went to bed on the night of January 21-22, 1988 
(Tr. at 366). He slept until about 6:00 a.m., then woke with 
stomach discomfort (Tr. at 366 and 382-83). He was dizzy, 
suffered cold sweats, vomited and was unable to go to a scheduled 
pool tournament (Tr. at 366-67 and 383). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
support defendant's convictions for attempted murder by three 
different means. First, defendant purchased heroin with the 
stated intent to use it to kill her husband. She put the heroin 
in a capsule and gave it to her husband. He became violently ill 
and vomited; the attempted heroin overdose did not have its 
desired effect. Second, defendant filled the victim's ampicillin 
capsules with oxalic acid, a poison if too much is introduced 
into the body. She administered these capsules over a course of 
a month. The capsules caused the victim to have stomach cramps, 
weakness, and a burning sensation in his esophagus. Finally, 
defendant purchased what she thought was methamphetamine, with 
the stated purpose of administering an overdose to her husband. 
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Defendant has waived her right to challenge on appeal 
the admission of her statements by failing to object to their 
admission at the time of trial. 
The trial court's determination that the corpus delicti 
rule did not apply to defendant's out-of-court statements was not 
error. Case law supports a finding that the corpus delicti rule 
does not apply to pre-crime statements. There is also support 
for a theory that statements such as those in the present case 
should be treated differently than confessions made to 
authorities when the declarant is aware that the authorities 
suspect him or her of criminal activity. 
The State urges this Court to adopt a reliability of 
confession approach for corroboration in attempt crimes because 
such crimes do not have the completed injury or wrong required 
for the traditional corpus delicti rule. Such a standard has 
been adopted by the majority of federal jurisdictions and several 
states. This different approach accomplishes the same purposes 
as the traditional rule without causing some of the problems 
found when the traditional rule is applied. Under this 
trustworthiness approach, defendant's statements are admissible 
because their trustworthiness was independently corroborated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICTS 
CONVICTING DEFENDANT. 
Defendant first claims that the evidence presented at 
trial does not support the jury's verdicts convicting her of 
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three counts of attempted murder. The appellate courts of this 
state have repeatedly articulated the standard of review on 
appeal when the argument concerns sufficiency of the evidence. 
The appellate courts accord great deference to the jury verdict. 
It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence 
and determine the credibility of the witnesses. "[T]he Court 
should only interfere when . . . reasonable men could not 
possibly have reached a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." 
State v. Lammf 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). Furthermore, 
defendant has the burden of establishing "that the evidence was 
so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime." State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). See 
also State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989). The courts 
have succinctly stated that, unless there is a clear showing of a 
lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld. See Lamm, 606 
P.2d at 231. 
Inherent in a defendant's burden to establish the 
inconclusiveness or insubstantiality of the evidence under 
Kerekes is an obligation to marshal all of the evidence which 
supports the jury verdict, then show that the evidence is 
insufficient. In Cambelt International Corp. v. Dalton, 745 P.2d 
1239 (Utah 1987), this Court reiterated that: 
We consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, and we will not 
overturn that verdict when it is supported by 
Defendant does not challenge her conviction for distribution 
of a controlled substance; consequently, the State will not 
address that charge in this brief. 
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substantial and competent evidence. Von Hake 
v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 1985). 
"To successfully attack the verdict, an 
appellant must marshall [sic] all the 
evidence supporting their verdict and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to that verdict, 
the evidence is insufficient to support it." 
Id. 
Cambelt, 745 P.2d at 1242. Commenting on that quotation, the 
Court added a footnote in which it said: 
In Scharf v. BMG Corp.\, 700 P.2d 1068 
(Utah 1985)], we stated this standard of 
review as it then applied with respect to 
findings of fact entered in a judge-tried 
civil matter. The promulgation of Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure 52(a), which mandates that 
a trial judge's findings of fact "shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous," 
alters this standard somewhat in judge-tried 
cases. Still, the standard has continuing 
validity in regard to a jury's factual 
findings. 
Cambelt, 745 P.2d at 1242 n. 1. While these cases are civil 
rather than criminal, the standard is the same for criminal 
cases. The applicability of Rule 52(a) to criminal matters was 
explained in State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987), 
and the same standard of viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the verdict is also well established in criminal 
procedure. Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231. In another civil case, this 
Court, quoting State v. Walker, recently reiterated the 
obligation of an appellant to marshal the evidence in support of 
the jury's verdict, then challenge the finding. In re Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
Obviously the burden of proof is different between 
criminal and civil cases, but that difference in burden does not 
affect defendant's obligation to marshal all of the facts 
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supporting the jury verdict before attempting to demonstrate that 
the evidence is insufficient. In her brief, defendant mentions 
some facts which were adduced at trial but fails to include other 
evidence which was presented to the jury and which abundantly 
supports the verdict. That evidence will be pointed out as 
applicable in each subpoint hereafter. 
The elements of attempt are contained in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-4-101 (1990). That section reads: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, 
he engages in conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the 
offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct 
does not constitute a substantial step unless 
it is strongly corroborative of the actor's 
intent to commit the offense. 
Id. As with all crimes, proving an attempt involves proving a 
culpable mental state and proving conduct. Unlike proof of a 
completed crime, the conduct proven must only be conduct 
"constituting a substantial step toward commission of [an] 
offense," and this conduct must be "strongly corroborative of the 
actor's intent to commit the offense." Id. 
This Court explained this statute in State v. Pearson, 
680 P.2d 406 (Utah 1984): 
The statute adopts the definition of an 
"attempt" employed in the Model Penal Code, 
§5.01, purposed on drawing the line further 
away from the final act and enlarging the 
common law concept. It emphasizes what the 
accused has done, not what remains to be 
done. 
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680 P.2d at 408 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The 
Pearson case involved a defendant who conceded that the intent to 
commit the offense was present but that the acts proven "were 
preparation and not such as were directed toward actual 
commission of the offense." 680 P.2d at 407. This Court 
disagreed, stating: 
This appears to overlook the fact that the 
appellant was on his way to the scene of the 
burglary in a chain of events that, but for 
the arrest, would have resulted in a breaking 
and entering and robbery. The acts in the 
process were "conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the 
offense" that most certainly "corroborated 
the actor's intent to commit the offense," 
which intent the appellant does not deny but 
actually confirms. 
Id. 
In an earlier case, the Court had defined attempt in 
the following terms: 
An attempt to commit a crime is an act 
done with the intent to commit that crime 
beyond mere preparation but which falls short 
of its actual commission[.] 
State v. Norman, 580 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah 1978). As was stated in 
an Idaho case: 
The concern of the criminal law is to 
determine at which points along a continuum 
of activity criminal liability of differing 
degrees will attach. 
State v. Otto, 102 Idaho 250, 629 P.2d 646, 647 (1981). The 
determination of where, along the continuum between intent to 
commit an offense alone and the completion of the offense, an 
attempt has been proven is a matter for the trier of fact. 
Pearson, 680 P.2d at 408 n. 3 (citing State v. Workman, 90 
Wash.2d 443, 584 P.2d 382, 386 (1978)). 
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A. Attempted Murder by Use of Heroin. 
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial 
was insufficient to support the charge that she attempted to kill 
her husband by administering an overdose of heroin to him. 
However, defendant fails to marshal all of the facts which 
support the verdict. Given all of the evidence, the jury 
correctly determined that the evidence supported the charge. 
Cindy Orozco testified that defendant approached Cindy 
about purchasing enough heroin to kill defendant's husband (Tr. 
at 401). Defendant originally gave Cindy and Cindy's husband 
$300.00 to purchase the heroin, but the Orozcos spent the money 
for their own drug habit (Tr. at 404-408). Subsequently, 
defendant gave Cindy another $450.00 to buy the heroin; this 
time, the Orozcos bought the drug and gave it to defendant (Tr. 
at 411-14). A few days later, defendant told Cindy that the 
heroin had not worked (Tr. at 420-21). 
Defendant later told undercover officer Vojtecky about 
how she had chopped up the heroin, put it in a capsule, and given 
the capsule to Danny. However, Danny had awakened and vomited 
some five hours later; the heroin did not kill him (St. Exh. #11 
2 
at page 6) . Defendant's statement was corroborated by Danny's 
testimony at trial. He had taken the capsule given him by 
defendant the night of January 21-22 and gone to bed (Tr. at 366 
In this point regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the 
State will cite to the transcript of the trial and to the 
transcripts of the tape recorded conversations between defendant 
and others. The issues of the admissibility of the conversations 
and the sufficiency of the evidence to establish corpus delicti 
will be treated in Point II of this brief. 
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and 382). He awoke the next morning about 6:00 to 6:30 and went 
to the bathroom, where he vomited (Tr. at 366 and 383). He 
thought that he had the flu because he was dizzy, sweating and 
vomiting (Tr. at 383). The facts in the present case demonstrate 
that defendant went far beyond mere preparation when she cut up 
the heroin and gave it to Danny in a capsule. Only the fact that 
his stomach rejected the drug kept the attempt from becoming a 
completed murder. 
In her brief, defendant claims that Dr. Stonebraker 
testified that the victim's symptoms were not consistent with a 
heroin overdose. No citation is given for that statement and a 
review of Dr. Stonebraker's testimony reveals that he never made 
such a statement. Dr. Stonebraker's testimony regarding heroin 
consists of a statement that he tested Danny's body fluids for 
heroin or its metabolite but did not find them (Tr. at 335). The 
traces of heroin would leave the body within 60-90 minutes of its 
administration (Tr. at 334-35). Given the hypothetical, based on 
Danny Johnson's testimony and defendant's earlier statements, 
that the heroin was taken orally and then vomited some five hours 
later, Dr. Stonebraker opined that the heroin would have been 
expelled. That would further lessen the chances of finding 
evidence of the heroin in the body fluids (Tr. at 336). 
There was other expert testimony which defendant does 
not cite which dealt with the effect of oral administration of 
heroin. Dr. Douglas Rawlins, a toxicology expert, testified: 
A. The oral administration of heroin is not 
the usual way that it's administered. It's 
usually administered intravenously. When 
taken orally, it — unless it's taken in 
extremely large concentrations — and I 
honestly don't know how much you could get 
into a — into an ampicillin capsule, whether 
there's a large amount or a small amount, 
would have to be taken in extremely large 
amounts before there would be much in the way 
of symptoms. 
Q. What if just one capsule were taken, 
what type of symptoms would you expect? 
A. If the symptoms from heroin, if it's 
absorbed orally would be one of euphoria. 
The person would be somewhat euphoric at the 
very onset, followed later by an essentially 
central nervous system depression or sleep 
and drowsiness. 
Q. Uh-huh. Would the person experience 
vomiting, dizziness, those type of things? 
A. Vomiting, probably not. I would guess 
not, but I don't know after the oral — 
Q. Dizziness? 
A. Dizziness? Dizziness is not one of the 
usual symptoms after heroin ingestion, no. 
(Tr. at 479 and 492-93) (emphasis added). Clearly Dr. Rawlins 
did not testify that Danny Johnson's symptoms could not have been 
caused by the capsule with heroin that defendant had given him. 
Dr. Rawlins testified that he did not know the symptoms after 
oral ingestion of heroin. 
At best, defendant might claim that there was 
contradictory evidence about whether Danny Johnson's symptoms the 
morning of January 22 were caused by oral ingestion of heroin. 
However, 
[t]he existence of contradictory evidence or 
of conflicting inferences does not warrant 
disturbing the jury's verdict. State v. 
Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P.2d 584 (1937). It 
is within the exclusive province of the jury 
to judge the credibility of the witness and 
the weight of the evidence. State v. Wilson, 
Utah, 565 P.2d 66 (1977). 
State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). 
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The evidence presented at trial was that defendant 
purchased heroin with the stated intent of giving an overdose to 
her husband. She later stated that she had chopped up the 
heroin, put it in a capsule, and personally given the capsule to 
Danny. Five hours later, Danny vomited and rid himself of the 
heroin. This statement was supported by Danny's testimony that 
he had taken the capsule given him by defendant and later become 
violently ill. This evidence demonstrates that defendant went 
beyond mere preparation and took a substantial step toward 
murdering her husband. She actually administered the heroin 
intending for Danny to overdose. This evidence amply supports 
the jury's verdict convicting defendant of attempted murder by 
the administration of heroin. 
B. Attempted Murder by Use of Methamphetamine. 
Defendant next claims that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict convicting her of 
attempted murder by use of methamphetamine. In State v. Walker, 
765 P.2d 874 (Utah 1988), the Court said: 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
"So long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." 
765 P.2d at 874, (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 
1985)). The Court defined "inferences" in Wyatt v. Bauqhman, 121 
Utah 98, 239 P.2d 193 (1951), when it said: 
We have defined an "inference" as: a logical 
and reasonable conclusion of the existence of 
a fact in the case, not presented by direct 
evidence as to the existence of the fact 
itself, but inferred from the establishment 
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of other facts from which, by the process of 
logic and reason, based upon common 
experience, the existence of the assumed fact 
may be concluded by the trier of the fact. 
121 Utah at 109, 239 P.2d at 198-99. The question is, then, 
whether evidence of defendant's actions, plus reasonable 
inferences therefrom, support the jury's finding that defendant 
took a substantial step toward the offense of attempted murder by 
use of methamphetamine. 
The evidence presented at trial was that defendant 
spoke to Cindy Orozco about having a "new idea" when the heroin 
did not kill Danny (St. Exh. #7 at page 2). The next day Cindy 
was at defendant's home when defendant asked if Cindy knew where 
she could get some "crank," a street name for methamphetamine 
(St. Exh. #8-1 at page 3). Defendant said that she had learned 
from a television program that an overdose of methamphetamine can 
kill a person (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 4). Cindy said she would 
see if she could get the crank. Then, after a meeting with 
Officer Vojtecky, Cindy went back into defendant's home and asked 
how defendant intended to give Danny the crank (St. Exh. #8-1 at 
pages 5 and 10)• Defendant responded that she was going to put 
the drug in Danny's capsule (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 10). 
After discussions with the officers and after helping 
Officer Vaughn mix flour and brown sugar to make counterfeit 
methamphetamine, Cindy telephoned defendant and told her that 
Cindy could get the drug (Tr. at 426 and 109, and St. Exh. #9-1 
at page 2). Cindy asked what Danny's size was in order to 
determine how much crank was needed (St. Exh. #9-1 at page 2). 
Defendant responded by asking how much the drug was per gram, 
then eventually told Cindy Danny's height and weight. When Cindy 
told defendant the crank would cost $500.00, defendant asked for 
an hour to think about it (St. Exh. #9-1 at page 3). When Cindy 
called back, defendant said that she wanted the crank but that 
she could not get the cash until the next morning (St. Exh. #9-1 
at page 4). 
The next day, defendant told Cindy that she would bring 
the money to Cindy's house; defendant said that defendant's 
mother had written a check for the amount and defendant would 
cash it (St. Exh. #10 at page 2). Defendant arrived at Cindy's 
house and met Officer Vojtecky who was posing as Cindy's 
boyfriend (Tr. at 237-39). Defendant talked to Cindy and 
Vojtecky about whether the crank was bitter and whether she could 
put it in Danny's coffee (St. Exh. #11 at pages 1-2 and 4). 
Defendant debated about putting the crank in a capsule as she had 
done with the heroin, but finally decided to put it in Danny's 
coffee (St. Exh. #11 at pages 4, 6 and 8). Vojtecky told 
defendant point blank that the crank would kill Danny and asked 
if she wanted to kill him. Defendant replied that she did (St. 
Exh. #11 at 9). During this meeting, defendant gave Vojtecky 
$500.00 for the drug (Tr. at 239-40). 
That evening, Cindy telephoned defendant and told her 
that they had the methamphetamine (Tr. at 241). At approximately 
8:45 p.m., Vojtecky and Cindy met with defendant at an old 
Highway Patrol weigh station and gave defendant the counterfeit 
drug (Tr. at 241, 244-47, and 425-26; St. Exh. #12). When 
defendant left the meeting place, she was stopped and arrested by 
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other officers about two miles down the road. Those officers, 
and later Vojtecky, searched the car and were unable to find the 
counterfeit drug (Tr. at 269-71 and 295-98). The evidence showed 
that the area between where defendant received the counterfeit 
methamphetamine and where she was stopped was grassy, extensively 
traveled by vehicles, and that there were people walking in the 
area as well (Tr. at 297). The fact that the counterfeit 
substance was not found does not negate the testimony of Officer 
Vojtecky and Cindy that the substance was handed to defendant. 
The evidence clearly established defendant's intent and 
preparation to use methamphetamine to kill her husband. Beyond 
that, the evidence demonstrates that defendant took substantial 
steps to that end by giving $500.00 to Vojtecky to purchase the 
methamphetamine, then obtaining what she thought was the drug 
from Vojtecky. State v. Reese, 1988 WL 1556 (Ohio App. 1988) 
(unpublished). The evidence is not so insubstantial or 
inconclusive as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt; 
therefore, the jury's verdict should be affirmed. 
C. Attempted Murder by Use of Oxalic Acid. 
Finally, defendant claims that her conviction for 
attempted murder by use of oxalic acid is not based upon 
sufficient evidence. The same legal standards delineated above 
apply to this argument, and again, the evidence clearly supports 
the jury's verdict. 
On January 29, 1988, defendant told Cindy that 
defendant had put M[a] whole bottle" of oxalic acid in Danny's 
capsules (St. Exh. #8-1 at page 4). At the same time, defendant 
showed Cindy the bottle of oxalic acid, which defendant kept 
under the kitchen sink (Tr. at 428-29). The next day, defendant 
also told Vojtecky (acting as Cindy's boyfriend) that, in the 
last month, she had given Danny nearly a whole bottle of the 
substance (St. Exh. #11 at page 4-5). In fact, Danny was still 
taking the capsules which had oxalic acid in them (St. Exh. #11 
at page 5). 
Defendant's statements about administering the oxalic 
acid to Danny was verified when officers seized the bottle of the 
substance from under defendant's kitchen sink (Tr. at 219-20). 
Officers also retrieved Danny's bottle of capsules from the bar 
owned by defendant (Tr. at 209-10). These bottle and capsules 
were taken to the Weber State Crime Lab for testing (Tr. at 161). 
While the capsules were marked ampicillin, the substance inside 
was not ampicillin; the substance tested to be the same as that 
found in the oxalic acid bottle (Tr. at 164-69). Oxalic acid 
occurs naturally in the body but is a poison if too much is 
ingested (Tr. at 171-72 and 333-34). 
Further corroboration of defendant's statement about 
giving Danny oxalic acid came from his testimony. The victim 
testified that his first prescription had not caused any problems 
but that the capsules in the refill had given him stomach cramps, 
a burning in his esophagus, and weakness (Tr. at 364-65 and 370-
73). 
Defendant introduced evidence in an attempt to dispute 
the findings that the capsules contained oxalic acid (Tr. at 482-
86 and 334-35). As noted above: 
The existence of contradictory evidence or of 
conflicting inferences does not warrant 
disturbing the jury's verdict. State v. 
Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P.2d 584 (1937). 
Howell, 649 P.2d at 97. The same standard should be applied to 
the victim's testimony that defendant had not "come out and 
sa[id] that she was going to kill" him (Tr. at 369). When Mr. 
Johnson's recollection was refreshed by a transcript of a 
conversation he had with officers, Mr. Johnson tempered his 
statement with, "She might have said it at one time, and like I 
said, in the last two years I cannot recall. I remember her 
saying she wished I was dead once." (Tr. at 370). The jury 
correctly performed its duty and resolved any apparent conflicts 
in the evidence. 
The evidence produced from defendant's statements, 
corroborated by the bottle of oxalic acid shown to Cindy and 
seized by the officers, and corroborated by the presence of 
oxalic acid in the victim's capsules, amply supports the jury's 
verdict. No reasonable person would have had a reasonable doubt 
that defendant took substantial steps to kill her husband by 
giving him capsules filled with oxalic acid. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE 
THE ADMISSION OF HER PRETRIAL STATEMENTS BY 
FAILING TO OBJECT TO THEIR ADMISSION IN A 
TIMELY FASHION. SECONDLY, CORPUS DELICTI WAS 
PROPERLY ESTABLISHED EITHER UNDER THE 
TRADITIONAL RULE OR UNDER THE FEDERAL RULE. 
Defendant's second claim of error is that the State 
did not prove the corpus delicti of the crimes. She begins her 
argument on this point by stating, "Before the inculpatory 
statements of a defendant may be introduced as evidence[,] the 
State must prove the existence of a corpus delicti." (Brief of 
Appellant [hereinafter Br. of App.] at 18). This aspect of the 
corpus delicti rule is clearly an admissibility question, and, as 
such, is subject to the waiver doctrine. This brief will address 
first the admissibility-of-the-statements prong of the corpus 
delicti, then it will address the sufficiency-to-establish-
corpus-delicti issue. 
A. Waiver. 
While Utah cases have not squarely addressed the issue 
of waiver in the corpus delicti area, the rule is clearly 
established that: 
[a] general rule of appellate review in 
criminal cases in Utah is that a 
contemporaneous objection or some form of 
specific preservation of claims of error must 
be made a part of the trial court record 
before an appellate court will review such 
claim on appeal. 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987) (footnote 
omitted). Thus, in general, a defendant has waived the right to 
object to the admission of evidence if he or she did not raise a 
timely objection to admission at trial. 
Other jurisdictions have determined that the waiver 
doctrine is applicable to the admissibility issue under the 
corpus delicti rule. In Spright v. State, 254 Ind. 420, 260 
N.E.2d 770, 772-73 (1970), the Indiana Supreme Court held that 
defendant had waived his right to object to the admission of his 
alleged confession by failing to object to its admission at 
trial. See also Finchum v. State, 463 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ind.App.1 
Dist. 1984); People v, Miles, 77 Cal. Rptr. 89, 93 (Cal.App. 4 
Dist. 1969); Pullin v. State, 257 Ga. 815, 364 S.E.2d 848, 851 
(1988). Contra People v. Davis, 173 Ill.App.3d 300, 527 N.E.2d 
552, 554 (Ill.App. 1 Dist.), appeal denied, 535 N.E.2d 455 
(1988). The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine addressed the same 
issue in State v. Sheehan, 337 A.2d 253, 254 (Me. 1975), and 
determined to address the issue for manifest error since Sheehan 
had not objected at trial to the admission of his confession. 
That court found that there was no manifest error but reversed 
the conviction on other grounds. 
The record of the present case clearly shows that 
defendant never objected to the introduction of any of the tape 
recorded conversations (Tr. at 126-38). Neither did defendant 
raise the issue of corpus delicti until a memorandum in support 
of a motion for new trial was filed well after the trial (R. at 
312-21). Because defendant did not timely object to the 
admission of her recorded conversations, she has waived the right 
to raise the issue on appeal. 
B. The Applicability of Corpus Delicti to Pre-Crime 
Statements. 
Even if this Court were to overlook defendant's waiver 
on the corpus delicti issue, the conviction should still be 
affirmed on the merits of the question. Defendant's statements 
were properly admitted as either not falling under the corpus 
delicti rule, or as admissible under the trustworthiness version 
of the corpus delicti rule. The applicability of the different 
versions of the corpus delicti rule will be addressed in subpoint 
C. 
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Although there is no Utah case law on this issue, some 
commentators and courts have determined that neither the 
traditional corpus delicti rule nor the federal corpus delicti 
rule (as described in subpoint C below) applies to "statements, 
inconsistent with innocence, made by the accused before the crime 
was committed." Perkins, The Corpus Delicti of Murder, 48 Va. L. 
Rev. 173, 178 (1962). This position was stated in Warszower v. 
United States, 312 U.S. 342 (1941): 
The rule requiring corroboration of 
confessions protects the administration of 
the criminal law against errors in 
convictions based upon untrue confessions 
alone. Where the inconsistent statement was 
made prior to the crime this danger does not 
exist. Therefore we are of the view that 
such admissions do not need to be 
corroborated. They contain none of the 
inherent weaknesses of confessions or 
admissions after the fact. 
312 U.S. at 347. Castillo v. State, 614 P.2d 756, 759 (Alaska 
1980) (citing Perkins and Warszower). Although this language in 
Warszower (paraphrased in Castillo) seems to imply that any 
statements made before a crime was allegedly committed are 
sufficient to convict without a determination of corpus delicti, 
both cases also imply a determination that a crime had occurred. 
Warszower was a case involving the obtaining of a passport by use 
of false statements; the prosecution had used defendant's 
previous inconsistent statements to prove that the statements 
made to obtain the passport were false. In Castillo, the 
appellate court found that the State had established sufficient 
corpus delicti to sustain a murder conviction by coupling 
defendant's pre-crime threats toward the victim with the evidence 
of a fight between defendant and the victim. Defendant's post-
crime statement that he had thrown the victim from a bridge (the 
body was not found) was supported by the futile attempts by 
family and authorities to find the victim. The language 
regarding the reliance on pre-crime statements being more 
trustworthy may lessen the degree of proof necessary to establish 
that a crime has been committed but may not negate it altogether. 
The very term "pre-crime statements" appears to presuppose the 
existence of some evidence that a crime has been committed; 
however, it may be that the quantum of evidence to trigger the 
use of pre-crime statements may not be as great as that required 
to corroborate post-crime confessions or admissions. 
In the present case, there are two situations of pre-
crime statements by defendant. One is the statement to Cindy 
that defendant wanted to purchase heroin to administer an 
overdose to defendant's husband (Tr. at 401). This occurred 
before the crime of attempted murder by actually administering 
the heroin to the victim. The other statement is that made to 
Cindy and Vojtecky that defendant wanted to purchase 
methamphetamine to kill her husband (St. Exh. #11 at page 9). 
This statement occurred before the actual purchase of the 
counterfeit drug which constituted a substantial step toward the 
crime of murder. While, as is argued below, there is sufficient 
evidence to establish the corpus delicti for the heroin charge 
and the oxalic acid charge even under the traditional rule, the 
evidence under the traditional rule does not so clearly support 
corpus delicti for the methamphetamine count. However, under the 
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arguably relaxed rule stated in Warszowery the evidence of the 
purchase of the methamphetamine should be sufficient to remove 
defendant's pre-crime statement regarding her intent in 
purchasing the methamphetamine from the purview of the corpus 
delicti rule. 
C. Sufficiency of Evidence to Prove Corpus Delicti, 
Even though defendant has waived the right to object to 
the admission of her tape recorded conversations, defendant asks 
this Court to address the question of the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a finding that corpus delicti was 
established. This differs from the issue in Point I of this 
brief which was the question of sufficiency of the evidence to 
support defendant's convictions. The argument in that point 
included the statements by defendant in demonstrating that the 
evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. In this 
point, the argument focuses on whether there was sufficient 
evidence to establish corpus delicti without the statements. 
While defendant has phrased this issue in terms of a 
trial court's determination that the State had proven corpus 
delicti, that is not correct. In fact, in response to 
defendant's post-trial motion for new trial or, in the 
alternative, for dismissal, the trial court found that the tape 
recorded conversations of defendant did not fall within the 
purview of the corpus delicti rule (R. at 337-31; a copy of the 
memorandum decision and order are attached as Addendum B). On 
the basis of memoranda submitted by counsel for both parties and 
argument at a hearing on the motion, the trial court determined 
that: 
the State vs. Weldon case cited by Defendant 
(314 P.2d 353 [1957]) does not extend the 
Corpus Delecti [sic] Rule as it relates to 
confessions made by the Defendant to all 
statements made by the Defendant. 
In this case, the now objected to 
statements were made in connection with the 
activity itself, not after arrest and were 
not introduced in the form of a confession 
but to show a motive and intent at the time 
other actions were taking place. It is the 
judgment of this Court that such statements 
are admissible as part of the case in chief 
and may be used to show Corpus Delecti [sic]. 
(R. at 328). This legal conclusion by the trial court must be 
reviewed under the correction of error standard set forth in City 
of Monticello v. Christensen, 129 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (Utah March 2, 
1990). In that case, this Court said: 
we accord a lower court's statement of the 
law, . . . or legal conclusion no particular 
deference, but review it for correctness. 
Id. at 6. 
The trial court did not cite to any cases in support of 
its finding that the corpus delicti rule is not applicable to 
defendant's statements made during the course of the crime. Most 
of the case law in this area deals specifically with confessions 
and admissions which are made post-crime and post-arrest, or, at 
the very least, when a defendant knows that he or she is the 
focus of an investigation. The case law speaks of the corpus 
delicti rule in terms of statements made to authority figures 
which a defendant knows to be such. 
While the trial court did not articulate support for 
its decision regarding statements made in the course of the 
criminal activity, some tangential support for that proposition 
is found in case law in Utah and elsewhere. See generally 
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Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1316-26 (1956). This Court, in State v. 
Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 126 P.2d 1047 (1942), defined the 
difference between confessions and admissions: 
A confession is the admission of guilt by 
the defendant of all the necessary elements 
of the crime of which he is charged, 
including the necessary acts and intent. An 
admission merely admits some fact which 
connects or tends to connect the defendant 
with the offense but not with all the 
elements of the crime. 
126 P.2d at 1052 (citations omitted). In the context of the 
voluntariness of a confession, the Court in Karumai stated that 
it was not necessary to make a preliminary showing of 
voluntariness before receiving an admission, as opposed to a 
confession. See also State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 
1010, 1013 (1938). Thus, the trial court in the instant case has 
support in finding that the statements and admissions made by 
defendant can be treated differently from an extrajudicial 
confession. As is noted in subpoint B above, statements and 
admissions made in the context of the commission of the crime do 
not have the untrustworthiness which the corpus delicti rule was 
formulated to combat. See also State v. Saltzman, 241 Iowa 1373, 
44 N.W.2d 24, 27-29 (1950) (statements made during commission of 
the crime are part of the res gestae and not subject to the 
corpus delicti rule). On the other hand, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated that out-of-court statements by a 
defendant which show essential elements of the crime have the 
same possibilities for error as confessions. Hence, the Court 
said, such statements also must be corroborated. Opper v. United 
States 348 U.S. 84, 91 (1954). The Utah cases cited in 
appellant's and this brief all deal with post-crime and post-
arrest confessions by defendants. As such, they clearly fall 
within the traditional rule for establishing corpus delicti. 
There does not seem to be any case law which directly 
addresses the applicability of the corpus delicti rule to 
statements made by a defendant during the course of a crime. 
However, the trial court encountered the problems which arise 
when the traditional corpus delicti rule is applied to attempt 
crimes as will be discussed below. His ruling was an effort to 
address these problems. As set out hereafter, these problems can 
be resolved by an analysis of, and adoption of, a trustworthiness 
approach to the corpus delicti rule. When this approach is used, 
the defendant's statements in the present case were correctly 
admitted. 
The corpus delicti rule has not reached the stature of 
a constitutional protection. See Aschmeller v. South Dakota, 534 
F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1976). It is a rule which arose in English 
common law to reduce "the possibility of punishing a person for a 
crime which was never in fact committed[.]" 1 W. LaFave, 
Substantive Criminal Law 24 (1986). Corpus delicti "is an 
evidentiary principle requiring the prosecution to produce 
sufficient evidence to establish that a crime has been 
committed." Veldorale, The Principle of Corpus Delicti and the 
Evidence Pertaining Thereto, 39 Temple Law Quarterly 1, 2 (1965). 
In City of Bremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wash.2d 569, 723 
P.2d 1135 (1986), the Washington Supreme Court explained the 
corpus delicti rule as follows: 
The rule requiring independent 
corroboration of extrajudicial confessions 
and admissions is one of the oldest 
confession doctrines. 
The corpus delicti rule was established by 
the courts to protect a defendant from the 
possibility of an unjust conviction based 
upon a false confession alone.. . . It arose 
from judicial distrust of confessions 
generally, coupled with recognition that 
juries are likely to accept confessions 
uncritically.. . . This distrust stems from 
the possibility that the confession may have 
been misreported or misconstrued, elicited by 
force or coercion, based upon mistaken 
perception of the facts or law, or falsely 
given by a mentally disturbed individual. 
. . . Thus, it is clear that the corpus 
delicti rule was established to prevent not 
only the possibility that a false confession 
was secured by means of police coercion or 
abuse but also the possibility that a 
confession, though voluntarily given, is 
false. 
723 P.2d at 1139 (citations omitted). 
Three approaches have developed in American law to the 
corroboration requirement first found in the English common law. 
The majority of American jurisdictions 
follow a formulation of the corpus delicti 
rule which requires that there be 
corroborative evidence, independent of the 
defendant's confession, which tends to prove 
the commission of the crime charged.. . . 
Under this approach, the independent evidence 
is sufficient only if it "touches or concerns 
the corpus delicti." 
The second identifiable approach to this 
question is actually an extension of the 
above-stated rule. While the majority 
position requires that there be some 
independent proof touching upon the corpus 
delicti, a few cases have held that the 
corroboration must consist of substantial 
evidence, independent of the accused's 
confession, which tends to establish each and 
every element of the crime. 
The third approach to the corpus delicti 
issue has been denominated the 
"trustworthiness" version of corroboration 
and is generally followed by the federal 
courts and an increasing number of states. 
Under this rule, "[t]here is no necessity 
that [the] proof [independent of the 
defendant's confession] touch the corpus 
delicti at all.. . . [P]roof of any 
corroborating circumstances is adequate which 
goes to fortify the truth of the confession 
or tends to prove facts embraced in the 
confession." 
State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 337 S.E.2d 487, 491-92 (1985) 
(citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. at 92). 
It is unclear which version of the corpus delicti rule 
Utah follows. It appears that this Court has never before been 
asked to address itself to the distinctions between the different 
approaches. In State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010 
(1938), a woman was convicted of murdering her newborn child. 
Her conviction was based on her confession to the "county 
physician" that she had placed her hand over the child's mouth 
and nose and smothered it. The conviction was reversed because 
the Court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove the 
corpus delicti and render the confession admissible. In that 
case, this Court said: 
We adhere to the doctrine that there must be 
independent proof of the corpus delicti 
before the confession can be received for the 
consideration of the jury[.] 
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[The State must prove three elements before a 
conviction may stand. These elements are:] 
(1) That a wrong, an injury, or a damage has 
been done; (2) that such was effected by a 
criminal agency, i. e., without right or by 
unlawful means; (3) that the accused 
perpetrated the wrong, or aided or abetted 
therein, i. e., that accused was the guilty 
agent. A confession . . . serves as 
evidence, and if believed, as sufficient 
proof of the third point of proof, the 
identity of the guilty agent. It may also 
according to the language used be evidence of 
either or both of the first and second points 
to be proved. But the law . . . has wisely 
declared that there must be independent 
evidence of the first and second points, 
commonly called the corpus delicti. 
83 P.2d at 1014. Language in that case also seems to support the 
trustworthiness approach, later adopted in the federal system, 
when the Court said: 
[C]orroborative evidence must consist of 
facts or circumstances appearing in evidence 
independent of the confession and consistent 
therewith, tending to confirm and strengthen 
the confession. 
83 P.2d at 1016 (emphasis added). The burden of proving corpus 
delicti was later stated to be the "clear and convincing 
evidence" standard. State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 P.2d 173 
(1954); State v. Cooley, 603 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979); State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 478 (Utah 1988). 
Subsequently, in State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314 
P.2d 353 (1957), this Court again defined the corpus delicti rule 
in a manner very similar to the federal "trustworthiness" 
approach. The Court said: 
The purpose of the rule was to safeguard 
against convicting the innocent on the 
strength of false confessions. 
• • • 
Though the rule was extended to apply to 
other crimes [i.e., other than murder], in 
practical application the courts have 
attempted to hold it within the bounds of 
reason consistent with its original purpose 
of guarding against convicting the innocent 
and so that it is not applied to create a 
device for protecting defendants who reek 
with guilt. 
[T]he generally accepted view, to which we 
give our approval, is that the evidence 
independent of the confession need not 
establish the corpus delicti by separate, 
full or positive proof, and that the whole 
evidence, including the confession, may be 
considered together in determining whether 
the corpus delicti has been satisfactorily 
established. 
[T]he rule best suited to the administration 
of justice is that there must be substantial 
separate evidence of the corpus delicti, such 
that reasonable minds could believe that the 
crime is a real one which was in fact 
committed, and not one which is fanciful or 
imaginary. 
314 P.2d at 354-57 (footnotes omitted). See also State v. 
Cazier, 521 P.2d 554, 555 (Utah 1974) (corpus delicti does not 
require proof of every element of the offense); State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983) (corpus delicti requires only that 
the State present evidence (1) that the injury specified in the 
crime occurred, and (2) that such injury was caused by someone's 
criminal conduct). 
These cases deal with the standard corpus delicti 
question, namely that the injury specified in the crime occurred 
and the injury was caused by someone's criminal conduct. 
Problems arise when, as in the present case, the injury or wrong 
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has not occurred but has merely been attempted. Courts (although 
not in Utah) and commentators have addressed the applicability of 
the traditional corpus delicti rule in conspiracy and attempt 
situations. For example, one commentator has said: 
It is equally clear that where an offense 
contains no result element, such as is true 
of conspiracies or attempts for example, 
neither the corpus delicti concept, nor the 
reappearing victim rationale is at all 
relevant since the burning of the building, 
or similar result, is not even alleged. 
Despite this, the requirement of corpus 
delicti corroboration has been extended in 
most jurisdictions to offenses without result 
elements. 
Note, Confession Corroboration in New York: A Replacement for 
the Corpus Delicti Rule, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1205, 1214 (1978). 
See also City of Bremerton v. Corbett, 723 P.2d at 1140 (because 
of criticism of the corpus delicti rule, "the federal courts and 
a growing number of state courts have opted for a more flexible 
rule for corroborating confessions than the rigid rule requiring 
independent proof of all elements of the corpus delicti"). 
In the well-reasoned case of State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 
222, 337 S.E.2d 487 (1985), the North Carolina Supreme Court 
abandoned its adherence to "our strict rule requiring independent 
proof of the corpus delicti in order to guard against the 
possibility that a defendant will be convicted of a crime that 
has not been committed." 337 S.E.2d at 494. The North Carolina 
court spoke of the confusion and complexity engendered by the 
strict corpus delicti rule and the "varying and inconsistent 
interpretations" given the rule. 337 S.E.2d at 492. In 
addition, defining corpus delicti has become more complex as 
statutory law has become more extensive, precise and detailed. 
337 S.E.2d at 493. The court then said: 
Finally, we note that a strict application 
of the corpus delicti rule is nearly 
impossible in those instances where the 
defendant has been charged with a crime that 
does not involve a tangible corpus delicti 
such as is present in homicide (the dead 
body), arson (the burned building) and 
robbery (missing property). Examples of 
crimes which involve no tangible injury that 
can be isolated as a corpus delicti include 
certain "attempt" crimes, conspiracy and 
income tax evasion.. . . The difficulty of 
applying the traditional corpus delicti rule 
of corroboration to these offenses may, in 
part, account for the shift in emphasis to a 
rule requiring corroboration of each 
essential element of the crime charged. 
Perceiving this trend toward a broad 
interpretation of the corpus delicti, one 
author notes that: 
[T]he corpus delicti rule . . . is 
periodically misapplied, and its emphasis 
on the elements of the crime charged as 
opposed to the reliability of the 
confession has caused several courts and 
commentators to question the extent to 
which the corpus delicti version serves 
its original purposes, and to prefer the 
alternative trustworthiness version. 
337 S.E.2d at 493 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Note, 46 Fordham L. Rev. at 1216). In adopting the 
trustworthiness of the confession rule, the North Carolina court 
noted that: 
an increasing number of courts have become 
satisfied that the possibility of convicting 
a person for a crime which was not in fact 
committed may be adequately guarded against 
by requiring only that the prosecution 
produce evidence which corroborates "the 
essential facts admitted [in the defendant's 
confession] sufficiently to justify a jury 
inference of their truth." 
-AR_ 
337 S.E.2d at 493-94 (quoting United States v, Johnson, 589 F.2d 
716, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). North Carolina joined a "nearly 
unanimous" majority of federal courts, and state courts in 
Hawaii, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin in adopting the 
corroboration-of-the-confession rule. The court found that that 
approach assuaged the specific concerns underlying the corpus 
delicti requirement. 337 S.E.2d at 494-95. 
In the case now before this Court, this Court should 
apply a corroboration-of-the-confession, or trustworthiness 
standard. As defendant's crimes were attempts, there is no 
murder and, thus, no body to establish that a murder occurred. 
The purposes of the corpus delicti rule are satisfied, however, 
by establishing that defendant's statements are trustworthy and 
that the crimes of attempted murder did occur. This approach 
does not depart drastically from this Court's previous case law. 
As was noted above, this Court has never been asked to address 
the different approaches to the corpus delicti rule; 
consequently, no real analysis of the different approaches has 
been made. The Johnson and Weldon cases cited above seem to 
apply both the strict and the trustworthiness approaches. Since 
the present case does not deal with a completed crime, this Court 
may refrain from addressing which approach should be utilized in 
future cases involving completed crimes. However, where, as in 
this case, the crimes involve attempts, this Court should avail 
itself of the opportunity to address the problem of the corpus 
delicti rule in attempt situations. Where there is "no tangible 
injury," a "strict application of the corpus delicti rule is 
nearly impossible-" State v. Parker, 337 S.E.2d at 493. This 
near impossibility and the purposes of the corpus delicti rule 
can be addressed by adoption of the trustworthiness approach in 
attempt crimes. As discussed below, when the trustworthiness 
approach is followed in the instant case, the corpus delicti rule 
is satisfied. 
With respect to the charge of attempted murder by use 
of heroin, defendant's statements about her attempt to kill her 
husband were corroborated by other evidence at trial. The 
statements about the substantial steps which defendant took 
toward completing the crime were corroborated by Cindy Orozco's 
testimony that defendant gave Cindy the money to purchase heroin, 
then obtained that heroin after Cindy had purchased it (Tr. at 
404-19, 578-80, and 616-19). Further corroboration of 
defendant's statements came when her husband testified that he 
had accepted a capsule from defendant on the night of January 21-
22, 1988, and five hours later, he awoke, very ill. He vomited 
and was dizzy and sweating (Tr. at 366-83). 
The trustworthiness of defendant's statements in the 
charge of attempted murder by use of oxalic acid was also 
corroborated. Defendant's statements about the substantial steps 
which she took to try to kill her husband by giving him 
sufficient poison was supported by other testimony at trial. 
Danny Johnson testified that his original prescription of 
ampicillin had not caused him any problems but that when 
defendant told him that she had gotten a generic refill of the 
capsules, the pills caused stomach cramps, weakness and a burning 
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sensation in his esophagus (Tr. at 363-73). Further 
corroboration came from the testimony of officers who found the 
bottle of oxalic acid under defendant's kitchen sink and seized 
the ampicillin capsules from the victim. The capsules contained 
the same substance as that found in the bottle (Tr. at 165-69 and 
219-20). Danny's symptoms and the doctored capsules strongly 
corroborated defendant's statements regarding the steps she had 
taken to kill her husband by administering oxalic acid to him. 
The charge of attempted murder by use of 
methamphetamine is not as easily corroborated, mainly because 
defendant was not allowed to take the step of administering the 
supposed drug to her husband. It could be argued that the 
evidence independent of defendant's statements would only support 
a verdict that defendant purchased a substance which she thought 
was a controlled substance. 
However, under the trustworthiness approach to the 
corpus delicti requirement, defendant's conviction for this count 
should also be upheld. The circumstances of the statements made 
by defendant, coupled with the corroborated statements of her 
other attempts to kill her husband, support a finding that 
defendant's statements that her intent was to kill her husband 
with the methamphetamine were trustworthy. Since her statements 
were shown to be trustworthy, corpus delicti has been established 
and the statements were correctly admitted. 
The State urges this Court to review the strict corpus 
delicti rule as it applies to crimes, such as attempt, where 
there is no "result" element. Since in attempt crimes there may 
be no injury or wrong which can be independently proven, 
corroboration of the reliability of the confession or statement 
of a defendant should be sufficient to support a conviction. As 
the North Carolina Supreme Court determined in Parker, the 
trustworthiness approach accomplishes the stated purposes of the 
corpus delicti rule, and can reach crimes which do not have an 
observable wrong or injury. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Knock - knock 
Suspect: Peggy Johnson 
Undercover: Cindy and Steve 
Peggy: Who is it? 
noise 
Cindy: So, what's happening? Having a hard day or vftiat, here? 
Peggy: 
Cindy: You're going to start what? 
Peggy: 
Cindy: ....what's this for, your business? 
Peggy: .... I haven't seen him in three months....around 500 bucks. 
Cindy: Is that right? 
Peggy: ....mailed out by Monday. 
Cindy: And that's what you gotta do, like every quarter of the year, or 
sorrethin', is that what it is? 
Peggy: Yea. They tax ya on all the stuff that you buy they don't tax ya 
on I've got to pay taxes on it. Every year. 
Cindy: Wsll, want some coffee or something? 
Peggy: No. 
Cindy: Got burned out with coffee, huh? 
Peggy: No, I've only had one cup today. 
Cindy: Oh, is that right? You don't drink very much, do you? 
Peggy: Coffee? 
Cindy: Uh-huh. 
Peggy: Yea, I drink about four pots a day. 
Cindy: Oh, do you really? (Yeah) I didn't think you drank that much. 
Peggy: No, but at night I get so exhausted I put in it so my stomach 
don't get upset. 
Cindy: Oh, really. So he's able to handle that or vfriat? 
Peggy: VJhat do you think? "Can you mix it in coffee or anything, do you think? 
Cindy: I don't know about that. 
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Cindy: Ah, I don't think so. I've never really tasted it. Ya know. I can 
wake him up and we can ask him. 
Peggy: I'm wondering if its bitter. I'm wondering if it will work 
Cindy: I'd assume it would. 
Peggy: That's what ws done on the other. See I borrowsd this from my Mom. 
Cindy: You borrowed the money from your Mom? (inaudible response) Well, I 
don't know. I think, ah, I don't know. I can ask Steve. Do you want 
me to ask him? 
Peggy: He'll think I'm kind-a weird. Did you have fun last night? 
Cindy: You don't know about him. (laughter) I think he's. .WJ.. ?i"!:~X .. f-tClST 
WDrry about it, til, I mean, all night, then I had to go pick the kids 
up this norning and then I brought em hone and I, then I just told him 
"Here, take sane money and get the hell out of here. And go down to the 
mall or go to the show or v^a£ever." I still haven't had no God-damned 
sleep, ya know.5^ T. .that's &ry~, huh? 
Lifts o L;7ck a~< r*«- )*u o/.v. 
Peggy: <£ ean- i»aef«e wfey youLre ti^ed. 
Cindy: So, ah, don't you think that if you put enough crank in Danny's body it 
would kill him. What did that TV thing say? 
Peggy: It just said that it could, but I don't know how much they nean. If you 
take it all the time, all the time, every day, keep goin1, if that's 
what they meant or what. 
Cindy: Okay, so if if we get it cause the guy is already on his way, ya 
know, that's whv I keen oallin him, ya know. Cause I have seen those 
in , ne * s bringin' it right up, ya know. And he's just 
gonna bring it up to you cause I know gone very long. But how 
are you gonna.;........? 
Peggy: I don't know. That's why I wondered how much does it look like it is? 
Cindy: Well, it's just like powder. 
Peggy: Yea, I know it's powder, but how much quantity is it? 
Cindy: Wall, probably, vreli, a quarter ounce. 
Peggy: I don't know a quarter ounce, but 
Cindy: Okay, you know... 
Peggy: The only thing I've ever....is that it was folded in blue and white paper 
and they folded it in half, ya know. 
Cindy: Okay, those wsre probably like quarter grams or something, okay. You're 
talking quantity, okay? (Okay.) A quarter ounce is quite a bit. It's 
quite a bit, ya know. 
Peggy: Alright, a measuring cup. 
Cindy: Probably about a fourth of a cup. Somev*iere probably between an eighth 
of a cup and a fourth....it's a quarter ounce of anything. 
(inaudible voices from far away) 
Cindy 
Steve 
Peggy 
Cindy 
Peggy 
Cindy 
Peggy 
Cindy 
Peggy 
Cindy 
Peggy 
Cindy 
Peggy 
Cindy 
Peggy 
Cindy 
Peggy 
Cindy 
We had a hard night last night. 
last night? 
I tried. 
We had a good tine. 
You'll have to excuse us if we look a little rough, (laughter) 
He's never hung around.....'?*V?\or anything? 
Cfa no. He's from Salt Lake. 
Okay He doesn't work at the base or nuthin'? 
No! No, no, no, uh-uh! No, no. He's-aet affiliated. •fi/C/./'.°.//..alot. 
.guy. He's really good friends with him? 
I doubt that. I mean, I doubt that. He don't relate to a^ y-
Is Fred the one that's the Highway Patrolman? 
Ljfcz . . . . 
all the attorneys and stuff like that 
Not any more, they're not. 
Aren't they? 
No. All there are anynore are..' \".... and superiors. And Steve 
knows a few of them, ya know, but ya know, it's only a few of them. 
Peggy: They even stopped at the bar one day when Fred was up there 
Steve: I'm sorry, I missed vrtiat you ware saying there. 
Cindy: Oh, I was just telling her....she said you looked familiar, did you wsrk 
at Hill Field or anything and I said no. 
Peggy: Never been in Willard, I take it? j?; 
Cindy: Except last night 
Peggy: That's the third time, (laughter) Willardn's a one time thing. I mean 
Willard's such a fun place. 
Cindy: that's how I met him. From when I was married to Tyke, ya know, 
wall that's why I said you didn't have to WDrry, ya know, about him being 
cool If you catch my drift. 
Peggy: Is ..9T??.*... bitter? 
Steve: Yea, a little bit. 
Peggy: So you couldn't put it in coffee or anything? 
Steve: No, what, does he put cream or sugar or anything like that in the coffee? 
Peggy: No. 
Steve: Oh, that Is that v*iat you want to do? er? 
Peggy: Yea. (laughter) 
Cindy: He doesn't care. He isn't -gonna know. He don't care. 
Steve: Now, how big is he? er? 
Peggy: He's 170 pounds. Hey, have you told him what I've tried? 
Cindy: Uh-uh. Tell him. Go ahead and tell him. 
Peggy: Alright. I've tried - have you ever heard of automat acid? 
Steve: Ah, 
Peggy: It's like.. 
Steve: Ah, is it.... 
Peggy: No, it's crystal. I've tried that. I've tried (laughter) ah, 
Steve: tried 
P^-%%^ ...put it in his capsules... 
Steve: Did you put it in capsules? 
Peggy: Yup. Didn't work. 
Steve: How much did you put in? 
Peggy: So far, in the last month he's taken almost a whole bottle. Hasn't wDrked. 
Steve: Is that a pint, or a quart? 
Peggy: No. It's like this. About that big around. 
Steve: Alright. When was the last time you gave him some of that? 
Peggy: He's still takin' em. 
Steve: What do ya nean? He's already had some of that? You gave him some of 
that today already? 
Peggy: Yea. He takes his pills every day. 
Steve: just give it to him with his pills? 
Peggy: Yea. He takes four different kinds of pills every day. 
Steve: And you put soire of that in one of those? 
Peggy: No 
c.Wj : Three out of the four.... (laughter) 
Peggy: And he takes twD of them pills a day. 
Steve: What's happened to him because of that? Does he -
Peggy: Nothing. What's that stuff that kills mice?^;rx ' 
Steve: Poison... 
Peggy: Ya know them little things - ya know, that little box -
Cindy: A trap? 
Peggy: Oh, a box of Deoon. Didn't do a thing to him. 
Steve: You gave him a whole box of Decon? 
Peggy: Uh-huh. In capsules, (laughter) ...during the vfoole month. 
Steve: Was that recently? 
Peggy: Yes. He Didn't do a thing. And then a whole capsule full of -
I don't know what you call it...black pa*%y stuff. 
Cindy: The heroine. 
Peggy: Heroine. A vfaole -
Cindy: A gram. 
Steve: Man. What does he - has he water, or something? 
Peggy: He drinks alot. 
Steve: Well, the crank can do it. I mean, if you want him dead, the crank will do it. 
Peggy: Yea, but shouldn't heroine too? 
Steve: Ah, 
.A'v. / 
pa^c u 
Cindy: See, we was talkin1 and vrtiat we figured was probably vAien he vomited, 
cause remember - you told me - t e l l him vfaat happened. 
Peggy: Alright. He had it in his system for five hours. Then he just got up 
and got sick like he had the flu, and just kept on throwing up. 
Steve: Yea, that' s alot of heroine inside of ya your stomach 
upset and throw it up. You're lucky if you throw it up. Now, when 
did you give him the heroine? 
Peggy: Two weeks ago. 
Cindy: It was the 21st, wasn't it? 
Peggy: Yea. It was last Thursday night. 
Steve: When did - did you put that in a capsule? 
Peggy: Uh-huh. 
Steve: Then how do you know he took that particular capsule? 
Peggy: Because I gave it to him. (laughter) 
Steve: Oh, okay. 
Peggy: I got home that night and I chopped it all up real fine, put it in a 
capsule, and then WDke him up and said, "Here, take your pill" and 
(laughter) he 
Steve: That'd be a big pill. 
Peggy: No. I chopped it up really good because it was only like that. 
Cindy: I thought.... 
Peggy: No. It was only about like that. I took a razor and I cut it up and 
put it in a capsule. Gof a little f'?Wj. pin, and put it in the capsule 
and everything. 
Steve: You put a safety pin in the capsule? 
Peggy: Oh no. I didn't want to touch the . .e.r???*~ks I put it in. I had my 
rubber gloves on and everything and it was really simple. 
Steve: And vrtiat time did you wake him up? 
Peggy: He woke up by himself at six o'clock. 
Steve: At night? 
Peggy: No. In the morning. I gave it to him at one o'clock that morning. 
Cindy: So that was like five hours, huh? 
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Steve: So he had an empty stomach when you gave it to him or was it full? 
Peggy: I don't know. I wasn't talkin' to him. He went home early that night 
and I had a ?Vl*. .tc.u.r??."/?*.Thursday night, and when I got home he was 
asleep. I don't know. I think Sharon irede pizza that night and he had 
a piece of pizza, (laughter) 
Steve: Oh, manl 
Cindy: 
Steve: Now, vrtiat are you gonna do, you know, when he 's dead? How are you 
gonna - vAiat's your plan on i t ? 
Peggy: Cover him. 
Steve: How are you gonna when he's dead? 
Peggy: Hey, every day in that bar, if somebody cones in and he's a hypercondriac, 
they give him a pill of this. They give him a pill of that. He's been 
acting really strange! He's noody. People seen him. He gets pissed at 
the customers. I mean 
H*6«~ L,A rur *,*>«£?»< 
Steve: I can see why. 
Peggy: Oti,"*!*. ?:T. .L.'f*. :7....., not just lately. 
Steve: Well, does he take anything other than - does he take another drug? 
Peggy: No. Back vfaen he was in Vietnam and everything - and like, I like to 
snoke a little bit of vreed and stuff like that, and he thinks I'm weird. 
Steve: Well, vghat kind of capsules is he taking now, though? 
Peggy: Ampicillin. 
Steve: What has he got? Why is he taking those? 
Peggy: Because he thinks they're all helping his head cold. 
Steve: Oh, okay. 
Cindy: His head cold? 
Peggy: Yea, and he takes decongestants - all the other ones are capsules. 
Then he takes six vitamins a day. 
Steve: You're really serious about this? 
Peggy: I've got three kids. My oldest kid three months ago had a full set of 
braces. And she got home a half hour \atapnenicjht, didn't do nothing. 
And she's got scars inside her lipsT.. .'.hit-fiur. * He knocks the shit out 
of m/ kids all the time. My kids are petrified of him. If I could, I 
don't fight. I don't bitch at him or anything. And if I look the wrong 
way, I'll hit him. I mean, he won't work. He quit a job at Hill Air Force 
Base after 17 years, and anything he wants he goes out and buys. I got to 
r«v for it. T'he aot four iobs. 
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Steve: Are you gonna get 9one money out of this deal or vtfiat? 
Peggy: No. He doesn't have no life insurance or nothin1 like that. 
The only thing he's got coming is his retirement. 
Steve: Will you get that then? er -
Peggy: I don't know. I don't know where he's sent it to. I don't know 
nothing about his retirement. 
Steve 
Peggy 
Cindy 
Peggy 
Cindy 
Peggy 
Cindy 
Peggy 
He filed for retirement five months ago. 
he fired or filed..(laughter) 
He filed a month after he quit the air force base. 
Oh, I thought he quit tWD years ago. 
Uh-uh. He quit in the fall. 
Oh. 
He quit, ah -
(sirens in the background) 
Cindy: ....thev have a god-damned car, the gas tank broke right over here 
atf.'^ '.'^ it has gas all over the edge, fire department on the shed 
up there waiting trying to clean up. Anyway, so 
Steve: Well, did you want your stuff now, that'll do it. And then what the 
hell you gonna - ya know - the capsule, if you're not gonna put it in 
the capsule, what you gonna -
Peggy: No, because I think with that capsule, I don't think one capsule a day 
will do it. 
Steve: Yea, probably not. So then you're just gonna put it all in his coffee 
at one time? 
Peggy 
Steve 
Peggy 
Steve 
Peggy 
Steve 
Peggy 
Yes. 
Ya gonna do that - now - does he live with you or 
Yes. 
Oh, okay. So you're gonna do it at home? 
Uh-huh. 
When ya gonna do it? 
I don't know. One night when he comes hone, or 
n( 
Cindy: Well, didn't you say he has to have, like - by the end of this month 
or something. 
Peggy: Well, right now. Okay. I'll tell ya. I've been trying to file for 
divorce for two years. He won't divorce me. He'd contest it. My Dad 
left me quite a bit of property, okay. That is my kid's property, but 
in a divorce he gets half m/ property because it's ccitinunity property 
because we were married when my Dad died. People say, "Oh gads, you 
can get a divorce." A contested divorce goes on for years. 
Steve: Does he get half of all of your kid's stuff and your stuff too? 
Peggy: My business. 
Cindy: Which is The Shack and the laundry. 
Peggy: He with him not working and everything, he needs to make 
a lively hood. He's got - even though he's got a 90% 
chance of getting the vfoole control of the bar. 
Cindy: Is that right? 
Peggy: Yea. 
Steve: Well, this stuff will kill him. Do you want to kill him then? 
Peggy: This sounds horrible, but yes. He's a, he's the most hateful person I've 
ever ran into. He hates everybody but himself. The only thing that he 
needs is a mirror to look at. 
Steve: It's pretty drastic, but 
Peggy: That's drastic, but people. Ya know, I know that if anybody knew about 
this they'd think I was hard on him. But I'm not hard on him and 
everything. If you seen what my kids've gone through the last year, and 
everything. I don't care what I go through, I've got to the point where 
I, God, I don't care, I'm gonna take my 357 and if he decks me again, 
I'm gonna shoot him. That's self defense. But then, I'd have a 
Steve: Okay. It'll probably take about an hour, maybe an hour and a half to 
Cindy: 
Steve: You being a-r{'* .c.V.h. -
Peggy: Thank God i^ atjaGt-a-
Steve: Your ftom gave you the money You didn't tell her what it was for, 
I guess? 
Peggy: No. My Mom just thinks he's an ass-hole, and everything. She's said 
she'd give me the money for a divorce. But he noved. out two years ago 
and then he decided he was gonna move back in. My brother's a cop -
Cindy: (laughter) I know that one scares me. 
Peggy: My other brother is a Weber County Constable. My cousin's a cop. 
Cindy: .^.^..what you are. 
Peggy: I'm a constable in Willard. 
Steve: Whew! Okay. What do you want to do now? 
Peggy: But you know, I don't ever think it'll come down to them ever thinkin' 
I'm doin' it. Everybody knows ire, ya know. I've lived in Willard all 
my life. And 
Cindy: ....just because, too much coffee? (laughter) 
Peggy: No it couldn't be too much coffee. 
Cindy: I don't even know.... 
Peggy: It probably is because of the high speed, but even everybody's oomnented 
how he buzzes around all the tine, too. And people teases hint sayin', 
"God damnit you're gonna take the wrong kind of pills and you're gonna do 
yourself in," ya know, cause one tine somebody brought in a prescription 
for percodan, and he's got him in the back room. 
Cindy: Oh, really? 
Peggy: Yea. In somebody else's name. No,I don't know if he's poppin' percodan 
because he one of the things he really likes to do is drink, 
drink, drink, drink, and everything. And he's always on a health kick. 
He always goes around lookin' in the mirror and stuff like that. 
Cindy: Because he thinks he's I know what you nean. 
Steve: Vfell, do you want to give us the money and then ws'll 
Peggy: Thirteen is an unlucky number, isn't it? (laughter) 
Steve: Where's the thirteen? 
Peggy: Thirteen is how much it has cost me so far, and nothing has worked. 
Steve: I'm sorry. It's cost you thirteen hundred? 
Peggy: so far I have. I 'm trying to get everything 
Steve: What was the other money for? 
Peggy: For the black heroine stuff. 
Cindy: it was, how much? 
Peggy: Well, somebody ripped us off almost four. 
Steve: Oh man, I don't remember that. Did I.... 
Cindy: No.This burned us for about, well it was about $300 was what it was. 
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Steve: Then you some ironey before for the heroine... ? 
Cindy: Seef and that didn't come through and then the other one did 
come through. 
Steve: And the heroine didn't work? 
Cindy: Cause, ah 
Steve: God, okay. I believe it'll take me about an hour, maybe an hour and 
a half. We can meet you somewhere later or whatever. 
Peggy: Okay, what tine is it? 
Cindy: It's about ten to four. 
Peggy: Okay. He leaves to go to wDrk at quarter to six again. 
Cindy: Then he'll be to WDrk at six? 
Peggy: I can be hone unless you want me to run back down here. 
Cindy: ....can bring it up. It's no problem. 
Peggy: Then I'll be at home, and everything. 
Steve: Is there any problems - is there going to be somebody there? 
Peggy: Only me. 
Steve: I hate - nobody else is going to be there? 
Peggy: Oh, my seven year old but she's always in watching the TV and everything, 
She don't fink. 
Steve: Ah-
Peggy: There won't be nobody there to 
Steve: Urn, just wsnderin', is there, well, like I say, it's okay, for you 
to leave for a little while and meet us, or something? Would that be 
awkward, er? 
Peggy: I could do that. 
Steve: Okay. What we're figurin', vfoy don't you figure we'll be there a little 
after six, maybe a little bit later. 
Peggy: Where at? 
Steve: Why don't I just call you, I'm just not comfortable in your house. I'm 
sorry, I just, I don't know -
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Peggy: And you think I 've got in ray walls? (laughter) 
Steve: Your brother or your uncle, or 
Peggy: Mf brother is .tV!.... .and he works out of Salt Lake now. He's the 
nunber one investigates officer for stolen vehicles. 
Cindy: Oh really. When did he start doing that? 
Peggy: He got transferred. He got the highest award in December for getting 
the itost recovered vehicles and so he got pranoted. 
Cindy: Well, vtfiy don't we just figure on meetin' somevAiere like, God I don't 
know, why don't we just holler when we get back and then 
Steve: We'll just call you about six or a little after six. 
Peggy: If it's a little bit after six and everything, maybe 6:30, I'll be at 
the bar. Just call me and tell me yw.$'.:.r'^ B+k*«- *f r*«. />*<*«,
 y*« *•«-. „ ^ 
Steve: Then you can get away for a few minutes? 
Peggy: Uh-huh. 
Steve: And we can meet you somewhere and 
Peggy: Ya know, my brother, he wDuld never even suspect me of smoking marijuana. 
Steve: If I happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.... 
Peggy: I only talk to my brother twD tines a month on the telephone. 
Cindy: So Fred never comes over? 
Peggy: No. Fred never cones over. Del, I never see Del at all. No cops ever 
come over to my house. More cops hang out at the bar. Off duty cops. 
Steve: Did we 
Peggy: No, all the ones that come in off duty are just sheriff's department and 
just want to get away from Brigham City. They go in and party. 
Steve: Would you give this stuff to him tonight then? Do you want to kill 
him tonight or how are you gonna plan that out? 
Peggy: I'll probably wait until tOTDrrow night, or MDnday night. 
Steve: And then, are you gonna fix him a cup of coffee, or vtfiat? I mean, that's 
your deal. All righty, well, 
Peggy: Do you want to take me out next week? (laughter) 
Cindy: He's real cool. He's real cool. 
Steve: Thank you. 
Peggy: You really think I'm weird, don't you? 
„u» v* 
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Cindy: No. He doesn't. 
Steve: Maybe I'm used to it. I don't know. 
Peggy: I've never, ever, ya know, I've thought and thought for two years. I've 
been thinking about it for two years. And it's against my religion and 
everything like that, but I don't think - I think that eventually if I 
don't do anything, I'm gonna be burying one of my kids. 
Steve: That's scary! 
Cindy: That is scary! 
Peggy: So, if you ever hit somebody that's six, seven or eight the wrong way, 
hard ya know, and everything, I mean, ah, 
Steve: Why don't you go to the police? 
Peggy: I'm a bail bondsman and constable. I'd have to go to the Sheriff's 
Department, okay? Ms and the Sheriff's Department don't get along 
because of my maiden name. My brother raised lots of hell with the 
Sheriff's Department. All the time he tells 'em how crooked they 
was all the time. So - and then I don't know if you heard 
about the Mike Busby case up in Brigham - the officer that got accused 
of raping a girl. Fraftk was takin' her in to the jail. 
Cindy: I don't remember hearing about that. 
Peggy: Well, there was an accident up there and the first officer on duty was 
..
l?.r.e,:'f..... And five minutes later there was a fatal a mile away. So 
he called for back-up to investigate this wreck, and there wsre twD girls 
drunk from Logan. 
Cindy: Uh-huh. 
Peggy: And so he went and got them and brought them in and the girl got a DUI 
plus and then he called me to come bail her out. Wfell, to 
get out of her DUI she said that she got molested on the way to the 
jail. She had another girl with her. But when I went and got her bailed 
out of jail and she was wDnderin' how to get back to Logan, and Mike 
says, "I can't take you in to Logan, but I can meet another Deputy at 
the county line, and he can take you home." kk\ . ??•'.<*• .'Ztii J./i'x/.\£i*i±.. 
"You just got nolested by a cop and you'd ride clean up from Brigham 
City to the county line?!" 
Cindy: Was there another.... 
Peggy: Uh-uh. The next day it was rape charges. He lost his job. 
Cindy: And what was the name? Mike Busby? 
Peggy: Uh-huh. This was year(s) ago. 
Cindy: And he was with the Sheriff's Department or something? 
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Peggy: He was in the Sheriff's Department. Well, the twD people that hadn't 
testified for 'em was .. JfrirtF.... and me. And you don't go to the 
Sheriff's Department if you don't tell the truth. You have to lie! 
But we went and told the truth. Because she didn't get raped by Busby. 
Ya know, it was set up. They didn't - they - the Sheriff's Department 
was mad at him anyway because it was elections and he was in the -beat 
for a new guy for Sheriff. And Bob Limb was after his ass for it.v^° 
Cindy: Oh, really? 
Peggy: It's all politics. 
Steve: Well, what about it? I mean, then there's - like - the Hawaii Five-0 or 
something, (laughter) state deal or something, somebody should be 
concerned that I mean. 
Cindy: It seems like. 
Peggy: It seems like they would and everything like that, but it - he is so 
.. ./I'fr^r..... I think if I turned him in, like my oldest daughter 
wants to turn him in really, really bad and she won't do 
it because she even knows that if anything happens he'll come right 
around. I could walk out of that bar one night and get blown away. 
Cindy: By who? 
Peggy: He knows, like,, oh QDdl^jpich ones did he know. Just a minute, he knows 
Van or Val, ^ jpjffi "^^rt ySdrtey^  ,: One time he got pissed off at somebody and 
he was gonna talk S^ 'em. The^guy worked at Hill Air Force Base. 
Cindy: is it -6t» Valley? 
Peggy: Uh-huh. Van or Val. Seems like he ran around with, ah, oh God! The guy 
that was connected in with the Prairie Scooner. But he was buying all 
the, stealing all the four wheelers and stuff like that and he got caught. 
What was his name? And he got put in prison then he got out after twD 
years and then he vent back and stole stuff again and got put back in 
prison. 
Cindy: Is that right? 
Peggy: Uh-huh. But he was runnin' around with him and there was, there's twD 
of them that, in Sun Valley that wsrk out at the Hill Air Force Base. 
Cindy: 
Peggy: One*thing Van or Val er -
Cindy: I know works at Hill Field. 
Peggy: See, one of em, one of em bought Danny's old Ford pick-up truck - 73 
brown and white Ford pick-up truck, four by four. 
(tape ends - turned over) 
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I^ggy: Something like that. Van Jensen. Is there a Jensen there? 
Cindy: I don't know. I've never heard of that name. No, if he's from Ogden 
it seems like I vould know him. Y know, cause I know a lot/F. .^i^:^"** 
guys from Ogden. I know almost all of 'em, as a matter of fact. 
Peggy: Well, that was - his name was Van, I think. 
Cindy: But I don't really think that they'd put themselves on the line for 
Danny. I mean, they'd have to be pretty - or, he'd have to pay them 
a hell-of-a-lot of money. 
Peggy: Would m/ insurance policies WDrk. 
Cindy: Huh-ah. 
Peggy: I've got an insurance policy on me for $1,000. 
Cindy: And he don't have one? 
Peggy: Huh-uh. He don't have one. 
Steve: Well, vre better be going. 
Cindy: Okay. Alright, we'll call ya, I guess. At about, probably about 
quarter after six, is that okay? Will Danny begone? 
Peggy: Oh, yea. He'll leave between 5:30 and quarter to six to the bar. 
Cindy: Okay. Alright. And we'll be back so you can get back so you don't get 
in trouble. And we'll just call you and meet you somewhere. Okay? 
Peggy: Okay. 
Cindy: So we don't have to come up to the house.... 
Peggy: (laughter) I can't believe you'd say 
Cindy: He's cool. If he wasn't cool I wouldn't have introduced him to ya, 
ya know. 
Peggy: All right. 
Hi 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PEGGY B. JOHNSON 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 881000024 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion 
for a New Trial. The Court having reviewed the file, the 
transcript and the arguments of counsel along with the cases 
cited in support thereof, now issues the following Memorandum 
Opinion. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Defendant's Motion is based essentially on two main points. 
First, there is no Corpus Delecti absent the statements of the 
Defendant and Second, there is insufficient evidence to convict 
on the counts. 
The Court notes that the transcript indicates that the 
challenged statements made by the Defendant, which were introduced 
at trial, were not objected to. The Court also notes that Rule 
77-35-24 U.C.A, Rule 24 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure provides 
that the Court may upon motion of a party or upon its' own 
initiative grant a new trial. In the interest of justice if 
there is any error or inpropriety which had a substantial adverse 
affect upon the rights of a party. 
In this case the critical question to the Court is whether 
or not the statements made by the Defendant in connection with 
the incidents alleged to have taken place, evidence ftifi;^f^ch was 
introduced at the trial, fall within the purvieft!'-<££) the Corpus^*^ 
Delecti Rule. C«:p l/ 1Q0Q A 
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The Court has reviewed the applicable cases cited by 
counsel and is of the opinion that the State vs. Weldon case 
cited by Defendant (314 P.2d 353 U.C.A.) does not extend the 
Corpus Delecti Rule as it relates to confessions made by the 
Defendant to all statements made by the Defendant. 
In this case, the now objected to statements were made in 
connection with the activity itself, not after arrest and were 
not introduced in the form of a confession but to show a motive 
and intent at the time other actions were taking place. It is 
the judgment of this Court that such statements are admissible 
as part of the case in chief and may be used to show Corpus 
Delecti. 
In view of this decision the Court is then also of the 
opinion that the Jury could very well find that the actions 
taken by the Defendant, in each of the counts, were taken as a 
substantial step toward the stated purpose which was to cause 
the death of Mr. Johnson as alleged. 
The Court is further of the opinion that the Defendant's 
lack of success in achieving her stated purpose is insufficient 
to defeat the intent with which the actions were taken. The 
analogy is much like firing a weapon at a target but inadvertantly 
missing. 
Consistant with this opinion, therefore Defendant's Motion 
for a New Trial is hereby Denied. Counsel for the State to prepare 
the appropriate order. 
DATED this / day of September, 1989. 
*"*; 
District Judge 
FTLT Gunnell 
4 5 NORTH FIRST EAST 
BRIGHAM CITY UT 84302 
(801) 734-9464 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs. 
PEGGY B. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 881000024 
The above matter having come before the Court on defendants 
motion for a new trial and hearing having been held thereon, and 
the Court having reviewed the file, the transcript, arguments of 
counsel and memoranda in support thereof, and the Court having 
issued its Memrandum Decision, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that said Motion 
be and is hereby denied. In denying the Motion, the Court adopts 
the reasoning set forth in its earlier Memorandum Decision dated 
September 7, 1989 and further makes the following specific 
findings: 
1. That all of the statements made by the defendant admitted 
at trial were made prior to her arrest and were made in conjunction 
with her planning the commission of several of the crimes for which 
she was convicted. As noted in the Memorandum Decision, the Court 
finds that the statements were made in connection with the illegal 
activity itself and were made with regard to her arrangiftjjjryft$£Tobtain 
FILED W/CO0Q&* 
items with which she intended to murder her husband. ^ 
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2. The Court finds that there was substantial evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict that the actions taken by the 
defendant, in each of the counts, were taken as a substantial 
step toward the stated purpose which was to cause the death of 
Mr. Johnson as alleged. The Court finds that the defendant's 
lack of success in achieving her stated purpose is insufficient 
to defeat the intent with which the actions were taken. 
DATED t h i s .Z^Lday of ^pfttfllMfts 1989, 
- * ^ 
F. L. GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL to the defendant's 
attorney, Ronald J. Yengich, YENGICH, RICH, XAIZ & METOS, 175 East 
400 South, Salt Lake City UT 84111, postage prepaid, this If 
day ofQ^pAji Ywl^A? 1989. 
-2-
Secretary / \ ( 
